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9 
PLAN SPONSOR FIDUCIARY DUTY FOR THE SELECTION 
OF OPTIONS IN PARTICIPANT-DIRECTED DEFINED 
CONTRIBUTION PLANS AND THE CHOICE BETWEEN 
STABLE VALUE AND MONEY MARKET 
Paul J. Donahue* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
During 2002, employees and their employers contributed over $84 
billion to defined contribution pension plans (DC Plans),1 bringing the 
amount held in such plans on behalf of many of America’s working 
people to nearly $2 trillion:2 a staggering amount that exceeded by over 
$200 million the amount held in defined benefit pension plans (DB 
Plans).3 
 
* Paul J. Donahue is a lawyer in New York City.  He is a graduate of Dartmouth College, and he 
received his Ph.D. and J.D. degrees from Yale University.  He is a Fellow of the Society of 
Actuaries, a Member of the American Academy of Actuaries, and holds the designation Chartered 
Financial Analyst.  He was formerly Senior Manager, Fixed Income Product Development, and 
Counsel, Fixed Income, for INVESCO Institutional (N.A.), Inc, which is the nation’s leading 
manager of stable-value investment vehicles. 
 1. A defined contribution pension plan is a pension plan funded by contributions of a 
specified percentage of an employee’s compensation.  BARBARA J. COLEMAN, PRIMER ON 
EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT 32-34 (BNA Books 4th ed. 1993). In many 
instances, employees are the only persons making contributions to a given DC Plan.  Id.  In other, 
rarer instances, an employer may be the only contributor to a given DC Plan.  Id.  In perhaps the 
most typical model found in today’s workplace, an employer will agree to match a portion of an 
employee’s contributions to the DC Plan.  Id.  For purposes of the nomenclature used throughout 
this Article, the employer, group of employers, or union establishing and offering a pension plan to 
its workers or members is called the “Plan Sponsor”; each employee who participates in such plan is 
synonymously called a “Plan Participant.”  Id. 
 2. More precisely, the total amounts held in defined benefit pension plans and DC Plans at 
the end of the third quarter of 2002 were $1.56 trillion and $1.80 trillion, respectively.  BUREAU OF 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, EMPLOYER CONTRIBUTIONS FOR EMPLOYEE PENSION AND INSURANCE 
FUNDS BY INDUSTRY AND BY TYPE, NATIONAL INCOME AND PRODUCT ACCOUNTS TABLE 6.11D 
(April 2004), available at http://www.bea.gov/bea/dn/nipaweb/TableView.asp?SelectedTable=208 
&FirstYear= 2003&LastYear=2004&Freq=Year [hereinafter NIPA Table]. 
 3. COLEMAN, supra note 1, at 32. A defined benefit pension plan is a pension plan under 
which the Plan Sponsor promises to pay a specified monthly amount to each Plan Participant (and, 
often, the Plan Participant’s surviving spouse or other beneficiary) for life.  Id.  This monthly 
1
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While DC Plans and DB Plans share the goal of providing retirement 
income to their Plan Participants, the way in which they seek to provide 
that income differs significantly in one respect.  Specifically, when a 
Plan Participant in a DC Plan retires, the amount of income available to 
him depends on the cumulative amount contributed to his account, plus 
the investment return of that account.4  The Plan Sponsor has no 
financial obligation to the Plan Participant beyond making any agreed-
upon employer contributions to the employee’s account.5  In other 
words, the Plan Sponsor is not directly responsible for the investment 
return in the Plan Participant’s account.  By contrast, in a DB Plan, the 
Plan Sponsor has the risk that the Plan’s investments do not perform 
well.  If the amounts that a Plan Sponsor has contributed to the DB Plan, 
plus the investment return of the Plan, are insufficient to make the Plan 
Sponsor’s agreed-upon payments to retired Plan Participants, then the 
Plan Sponsor must contribute additional amounts to the Plan.6  
Importantly, for both DB plans and DC Plans, the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act (ERISA) imposes on Plan Sponsors the legal 
obligation to act in the best interests of the plan participants.7 
 
payment is typically determined according to a formula that incorporates the Plan Participant’s 
annual average salary and the number of years he has worked for his employer.  Id. 
 4. Id. at 33. 
 5. Id. 
 6. 29 U.S.C. § 1082 (2000).  The main purpose underlying the enactment of the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1976, 29 U.S.C. §§1001-1461 (2000) (“ERISA”), was to require 
an employer providing a DB Plan to periodically measure its investment return and to compel an 
employer to contribute more money to its DB Plan if that investment return was not keeping pace 
with the employer’s benefit promises.  After setting out the commerce clause justifications for 
Congressional action, the stated reasons for action listed in 29 U.S.C. §1001 (Congressional 
findings and declaration of policy) deal exclusively with funding defects of DB Plans. For instance, 
despite the enormous growth in such plans, many employees with long years of employment were 
losing anticipated retirement benefits owing to the lack of vesting provisions in such plans; owing to 
the inadequacy of current minimum standards, the soundness and stability of plans with respect to 
adequate funding to pay promised benefits were endangered; owing to the termination of plans 
before requisite funds had accumulated, employees and their beneficiaries were deprived of 
anticipated benefits; and that it was therefore desirable, in the interests of employees and their 
beneficiaries, for the protection of the revenue of the United States, and to provide for the free flow 
of commerce, that minimum standards be provided assuring the equitable character of such plans 
and their financial soundness.  See generally COLEMAN, supra note 1. 
 7. 29 U.S.C. §1104 (2000).  A Plan Sponsor’s statutory obligation to act in the best 
interests of Plan Participants is called the Plan Sponsor’s “fiduciary duty.”  The ERISA conference 
report states: “The [fiduciary duty] provisions apply rules and remedies similar to those under 
traditional trust law to govern the conduct of fiduciaries.” Joint Explanatory Statement of the 
Committee of Conference on the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, reprinted in ERISA 
SELECTED LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1974-1986 33 (Anthony A. Harris ed., BNA 1988) (1986) 
[hereinafter BNA]. 
2
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Although ERISA governs both DB Plans and DC Plans, until 
relatively recently, the majority of assets held in private pension plans 
were held in DB Plans.8  In addition, because the primary concern 
underlying the enactment of ERISA was the existence of under-funded 
DB Plans, it was only natural that DB Plans received more of the 
Department of Labor’s attention when it came to the promulgation of 
regulations.9  As noted above, however, in recent years the economic 
important of DC Plans has grown significantly.  At present, nearly 54% 
of total private pension plan assets are held in DC Plans—and this 
percentage is likely to increase, because while $80 billion was 
contributed to DC Plans in 2002, only $39 billion was contributed to DB 
Plans.10 
Unfortunately, notwithstanding the explosive growth of DC Plans, 
the Department of Labor has still not addressed much of its regulatory 
authority to DC Plans.  Recent events, however, are likely to change this 
antipathy.  In particular, the bankruptcies of Enron and WorldCom have 
stimulated long-overdue and increased scrutiny regarding how well 
Sponsors of DC Plans are meeting their fiduciary duties.11  These 
bankruptcies had particularly disastrous effects on employees whose DC 
Plan assets were heavily invested in the stock of their employers.12 The 
very recently announced decision of IBM to freeze its DB Plan and place 
more reliance on a 401(k) plan is likely to accelerate the move away 
from DB Plans and elevate the importance of more intensive scrutiny of 
Plan Sponsor compliance with fiduciary duty in managing DC Plans.13 
One of the main duties of a DC Plan Sponsor is to choose the 
 
 8. As recently as 1985, the assets in DB Plans were double those of DC Plans. EMPLOYEE 
BENEFIT RESEARCH INSTITUTE, EDUCATION AND RESEARCH FUND, PENSION INVESTMENT REPORT: 
3RD QUARTER 2002 10 (Feb. 2003). 
 9. ERISA gives primary regulatory responsibility to the Department of Labor.  Of the early 
ERISA regulations, all pertaining to a single type of benefit plan apply to DB Plans. See, e.g., 29 
C.F.R. §2530.203 (2005) (minimum vesting); 29 C.F.R. §2530.204 (benefit accrual).  The focus of 
other regulations clearly has funding of DC Plans in view, see 29 C.F.R. §2550. 407 (2005), 
imposing limits on acquisition of employer securities and real property. 
 10. NIPA Table, supra note 2. 
 11. See Kris Frieswick, Prudent Man with a Plan, CFO MAGAZINE, June, 2002, at 75. 
 12. The losses of these individuals have drawn particular attention to the perils of employer 
stock as an investment option within a DC Plan.  See Unlearned Lessons in 401(k) Investing, 
MSNBC.com, http://msnbc.msn.com/id/5190102/print/1/displaymode/1098 (last visited Nov. 15, 
2005).  The length of the bear market after the boom of the nineties has led plan participants to 
make a more searching review of the options their employers offered them.  See Kris Frieswick, 
Honey, I Shrunk the 401(k), CFO MAGAZINE, Aug. 1, 2002, at 55. 
 13. See Mary Williams Walsh, I.B.M. to Freeze Pension Plans to Trim Costs, N.Y. TIMES, 
January 6, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/06/business/06pension.html. 
3
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vehicles in which Plan Participants can invest their money.14  ERISA 
allows a Plan Sponsor to reduce the liability it would otherwise have for 
selection of investment options if it allows its employees to choose 
among options that meet certain tests.15  A Plan Sponsor must also give 
its employees enough information about each of these options to allow 
its employees to choose intelligently.16 Because these provisions are set 
forth in Section 404(c) of ERISA,17 DC Plans that are designed to shift 
the responsibility for selection of investment options to Plan Participants 
are colloquially called “404(c) Plans.”18  Both Enron19 and WorldCom20 
offered 404(c) Plans. 
As might be expected, consultants have made employers well aware 
that 404(c) Plans can reduce a Plan Sponsor’s liability for the investment 
decisions of Plan Participants. However, consultants have not 
necessarily been as successful at educating Plan Sponsors about the 
liabilities that remain.21  Selection of a DC Plan’s investment options 
remains a fiduciary function, and Plan Sponsors must choose those 
investment options knowledgeably and thoughtfully.22 Even when the 
options are chosen with due care, Plan Sponsors must assure a range of 
choice and make adequate disclosure to participants in order to escape 
liability for the choices Plan Participants make among those options.23 
II.  STRUCTURE OF THE ARTICLE 
This Article is divided into two parts.  In Part I, this Article 
summarizes the scope of a Plan Sponsor’s fiduciary duty under ERISA 
and explains why that fiduciary duty extends to the selection of 
investment options for Participant-directed DC Plans (i.e., 404(c) 
 
 14. 29 C.F.R. § 2550 (1992). 
 15. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (2000). 
 16. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(b)(2)(B). 
 17. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Frances B. Smith, Your 401(k) Plan—Lessons from Enron, CONSUMER RESEARCH 
MAGAZINE, Feb., 2002, available at http://www.consumeralert.org/pubs/research/CRFeb02.htm. 
 20. See Jane J. Kim and Kaja Whitehouse, Getting Personal: WorldCom Fall Renews 
Pension Debate, DOW JONES NEWS SERVICE, July 10, 2002, at 1. 
 21. See W. Scott Simon, Fiduciary Focus: How to Bring Value to 401(k) Sponsors, 
MORNINGSTAR.COM, May 6, 2004, http://advisor.morningstar.com/advisor/doc/print_article/ 
1,8911,3620,00.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2005). 
 22. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (2000).  This obligation is usually called the “prudent expert” 
rule. 
 23. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(b)(3) (1992). 
4
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Plans).24  In this context, the Article will then examine some of the safe 
harbor provisions applicable to 404(c) Plans, including the requirement 
that such Plans offer a low-risk-investment alternative and the 
requirement that such Plans provide adequate disclosure to Plan 
Participants about each investment alternative. 
In Part II, this Article will apply the law explicated in Part I to a 
particular investment-option selection decision made by all Sponsors of 
404(c) Plans; namely: the decision to offer a money market fund versus 
a stable value fund.  In Part II, this Article argues that Plan Sponsors 
who choose to offer a money market option instead of a stable value 
option breach their fiduciary duty to Plan Participants. 
A.  Part I 
1. General Definition of ERISA Fiduciary Duty. 
Section 404 of ERISA addresses fiduciary duties.25  Specifically, 
Section 404(a)(1) of ERISA provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 
 
[A] fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to the plan solely 
in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and— 
 
for the exclusive purpose of: 
 
providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and 
 
defraying reasonable expense of administering the plan; 
 
with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances 
then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and 
familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of 
like character and with like aims; 
 
by diversifying the investments of the plan so as to minimize the risk 
of large losses, unless under the circumstances it is clearly prudent not 
to do so; and 
 
in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan 
 
 24. The Article will endorse recent suggestions that increasing knowledge about actual Plan 
Participant investment behavior and psychology must figure in the investment options selected by a 
Plan Sponsor.  In other words, ERISA decisions must be based on actual, not ideal, Plan 
Participants. 
 25. 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (2000). 
5
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insofar as such documents and instruments are consistent with the 
provisions of [ERISA].26 
 
Courts have concluded that Congress intended this definition to 
provide a great deal of protection to Plan Participants.27  In close cases, 
Plan Participants always win, as evidenced in the following 
representative opinion: 
The sincerity of the trustees’ belief was not questioned in the hearing, 
but it is essentially irrelevant to a determination of the prudence of 
their conduct.  While there is flexibility in the prudence standard, it is 
not a refuge for fiduciaries who are not equipped to evaluate a complex 
investment.  If fiduciaries commit a pension plan’s assets to 
investments which they do not fully understand, they will nonetheless 
be judged, as provided in the statute, according to the standards of 
others “acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters.”28 
For fiduciaries, ignorance of the economic characteristics of a 
particular investment is no excuse, as fiduciaries are measured against 
the standard of informed choice made by an expert.29 
One element of the definition of fiduciary duty that may loom larger 
in the future is the following phrase contained in Section 404(a)(1)(B): 
“under the circumstances then prevailing;” an ERISA fiduciary must be 
an informed fiduciary.30  As new information becomes available that “a 
prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters 
would use,” the ERISA fiduciary ignores such information at his peril. 31  
As the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated: 
An independent appraisal is not a magic wand that fiduciaries may 
simply wave over a transaction to ensure that their responsibilities are 
fulfilled.  It is a tool and, like all tools, is useful only if used 
properly . . . . [Fiduciaries] are entitled to rely on the expertise of 
others . . . . However, as the source of information upon which the 
experts’ opinions are based, the fiduciaries are responsible for ensuring 
 
 26. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A)-(D). 
 27. The conferees intended this outcome.  The Conference Report accompanying ERISA 
states: “The conferees expect that the courts will interpret this prudent man rule (and the other 
fiduciary standards) bearing in mind the special nature and purpose of employee benefit plans.”  
BNA, supra note 8, at 39. 
 28. Marshall v. Glass/Metal Ass’n & Glaziers & Glassworkers Pension Plan, 507 F. Supp. 
378, 384 (D. Haw. 1980). 
 29. Id. 
 30. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B). 
 31. Id. 
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that that information is up-to-date..32 
It would seem to go without saying that a prudent person acting with 
skill and diligence and familiar with investments should be aware of the 
statutory and regulatory requirements governing investment vehicles 
which the ERISA fiduciary is considering. As we shall discuss below, 
stable value depends on the ability to account for investment options at 
contract value, a marked variation from the usual standard of fair value. 
A paramount duty of ERISA fiduciaries dealing with Stable Value, 
above all fiduciaries with the duty to value participant accounts for 
purposes of transactions, is to assure themselves that participant 
transactions qualify for contract valuation. 
We shall discuss below how recent accounting and regulatory 
developments heighten the significance of the “under the circumstances 
then prevailing” standard.33 
2. Selection of Investment Options as an Element of Fiduciary 
Duty. 
In the preamble to the Final Regulations governing Section 404(c) of 
ERISA: 
The Department [of Labor] emphasizes, however, that the act of 
designating investment alternatives (including look-through investment 
vehicles and investment managers) in an ERISA 404(c) plan is a 
fiduciary function to which the limitation on liability provided by 
section 404(c) is not applicable. All of the fiduciary provisions of 
ERISA remain applicable, to both the initial designation of investment 
alternatives and investment managers and the ongoing determination 
that such alternatives and managers remain suitable and prudent 
investment alternatives for the plan. Therefore the particular plan 
fiduciaries responsible for performing these functions must do so in 
accordance with ERISA.34 
 
 32. Donovan v. Cunningham, 716 F.2d 1455, 1474 (5th Cir. 1983). 
   33. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (2000). 
 34. 29 C.F.R. § 2550 (1992).  In her article, Susan Stabile does not quote this completely 
unambiguous section of the preamble. Susan Stabile, Freedom to Choose Unwisely: Congress’ 
Misguided Decision to Leave 401(k) Plan Participants to Their Own Devices, 11 CORNELL J. L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 361, 377 (2002).  She quotes instead a restatement in a footnote. Id. at 377 n.78 (quoting 
57 Fed. Reg. 46,906, 46,924 n.27 (October 13, 1992)). Professor Stabile then interprets the logic of 
In re Unisys Savings Plan Litigation, 74 F.3d 420 (3d Cir. 1996), despite applying to transactions 
that predated the Final Regulations, as stripping this section of the regulations of any practical 
effect, by suggesting that it precludes an award of damages due to the breach.  Even if her 
interpretation of In re Unisys were plausible, it seems unreasonable to suggest that subsequent 
7
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The Department of Labor strongly reaffirms this position in its 
amicus brief in the Enron litigation. 
The scope of ERISA 404(c) relief is limited to losses or breaches 
“which resulted from” the participant’s exercises of control.  Section 
404(c) plan fiduciaries are still obligated by ERISA’s fiduciary 
responsibility provisions to prudently select the investment options 
under the Plan and to monitor their ongoing performance.  See 
Advisory Opinion No. 98-04(A) (‘In connection with the publication 
of the final rule regarding participant directed individual account plans, 
the Department emphasized that the act of designating investment 
alternatives in an ERISA section 404(c) plan is a fiduciary function to 
which the limitation on liability provided by section 404(c) is not 
applicable.’); Letter from the Pension and Welfare Benefits 
Administration, U.S. Department of Labor to Douglas O. Kant, 1997 
WL 1824017 at *2 (Nov. 26, 1997) (‘The responsible plan fiduciaries 
are also subject to ERISA’s general fiduciary standards in initially 
choosing or continuing to designate investment alternatives offer by a 
 
publication of the regulation would not have altered the judicial context. This seems wrong.  The 
statement quoted states emphatically that selection of the universe of choices is not the result of 
participant control, and therefore implies that a fiduciary cannot escape responsibility for provable 
damages when a Plan Participant chooses an option that should not have been available to begin 
with. 
  Professor Stabile’s reading of In re Unisys is seriously flawed. The Unisys Opinion 
frames the issues thusly: 
The plaintiffs, participants in individual account pension plans that Unisys Corporation 
maintained for its employees, alleged, inter alia, that the defendants breached ERISA’s 
fiduciary duties of prudence and diversification by investing plan assets in Executive Life 
guaranteed investment contracts, as well as ERISA’s fiduciary duty of disclosure by providing 
participants with misleading or incomplete communications regarding these investments and 
Executive Life’s financial condition. In their defense, the defendants raised a question of first 
impression, asserting that section 1104(c) of the Act, which relieves fiduciaries of liability for 
losses which result from a plan participant’s exercise of control over individual account assets, 
applies. 
Id. at 425. 
The Opinion later frames the issue of the extent to which damages might flow from control: 
In our view, if the Plans did not offer an acceptable alternative to GIC investments, a 
participant did not have the freedom and, in turn, the control to decide how his or her assets 
were ultimately invested. In this regard, we find the evidence lacking. The record includes 
documents which give a general description of the six funds the Plans offered; it does not, 
however, include evidence sufficient to measure the breadth of actual plan investments or 
assess all of the investment alternatives available to participants. 
Id. at 446-47. 
The Unisys decision actually supports the assertion that damages from the Plan Sponsor can be 
obtained as a result of option selection decisions, rather than the reverse.  Id.  There is no tension 
between the decision and the natural force of the preamble to the regulation.  Perhaps Professor 
Stabile’s desire to make a case for legislative reform has led her unconsciously to minimize the 
protection provided by the existing legislative and regulatory regime.  Stabile, supra, at 361. 
8
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404(c) plan.’).35 
A Plan Sponsor who has not exercised due diligence with respect to 
the selection of investment options in its DC Plan has unambiguously 
breached its fiduciary duty.36  No expert makes decisions without 
considering various alternatives and comparing relative benefits.37  
When due diligence is not exercised, then only the question of damages 
remains to be settled.  A Plan Sponsor would reduce litigation expenses 
simply by stipulating the fact of breach in such a case. 
It would be very difficult to prove that a Plan Sponsor’s review of 
DC Plan investment alternatives met ERISA standards without written 
documentation that included extensive quantitative analysis.  Vague, 
unquantified concerns, such as “I thought the X fund was safer,” would 
have no probative value.  An expert would identify all aspects of return 
and risk and provide the greatest expected return for a given level of 
risk. 
In many cases, the contrast between a Plan Sponsor’s approach to 
choosing managers for its DB Plan and the same Plan Sponsor’s 
approach to choosing options for its DC Plan would likely be sufficient 
to establish a breach of fiduciary duty. 
3. The Fiduciary Duty Safe Harbor of Section 404(c) of ERISA. 
Section 404(c)(1)(B) of ERISA provides as follows: 
In the case of a pension plan which provides for individual accounts 
and that permits a participant or beneficiary to exercise control over 
the assets in his account [i.e., a DC Plan], if a participant or beneficiary 
exercises control over the assets in his account (as determined under 
regulations of the Secretary) – (B) no person who is otherwise a 
fiduciary shall be liable . . .  for any loss, or by reason of any breach, 
which results from such participant’s or beneficiary’s exercise of 
control.38 
This statute establishes a “safe harbor,” which immunizes eligible 
plan fiduciaries from liability for breaches of their fiduciary duty.39  
While the statute itself is rather straightforward, the regulations set forth 
 
 35. Brief for U.S. Dep’t of Labor et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Tittle v. 
Enron Corp. (S.D. Tex. Sept. 3, 2002) (No. 01-3913). 
 36. See supra notes 30-33. 
 37. See supra notes 28-30. 
 38. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(1)(B) (2000). 
 39. Id. 
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several additional requirements that must be satisfied in order for a plan 
fiduciary to avoid liability for losses in a Plan Participant’s account.40  
One of the requirements has the effect of obliging a DC Plan to offer an 
“income-producing, low-risk, liquid fund”; another of the requirements 
relates to adequate disclosure of investment options.  Each of the 
requirements is discussed immediately below. 
4. The Requirement of an Income-Producing, Low-Risk, Liquid 
Fund. 
A 404(c) Plan must provide “a participant or beneficiary an 
opportunity to choose, from a broad range of investment alternatives, the 
manner in which some or all of the assets in his account are invested.”41  
Department of Labor Regulations Section 404(c)-1(b)(3) stipulates the 
minimum requirements for the range of investment alternatives; 
specifically: (1)  there must be at least three alternatives;42 and (2) the 
alternatives must “in the aggregate enable the participant or beneficiary, 
by choosing among them, to achieve a portfolio with the aggregate risk 
and return characteristics at any point within the range normally 
appropriate for the participant or beneficiary.”43 
A 404(c) Plan must also provide “an opportunity for a participant or 
beneficiary to exercise control over the assets in his individual 
account.”44  Reasonable restrictions on transactions are not inconsistent 
with participant control;45 however, at least three of the investment 
alternatives must permit transactions at least once in a three-month 
period.46 At least one of these three investment alternatives must accept 
transfers as frequently as instructions can be given for any other 
option,47 or each investment alternative which permits participants to 
give instructions more than once in a three-month period must allow 
transfers to “an income producing, low risk, liquid fund.”48  Plan 
 
 40. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1 (1992). 
 41. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(b)(1)(ii). 
 42. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(b)(3)(i)(B). 
 43. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404(c)-1(b)(3)(i)(B)(3).  The requirement of an income-producing, 
low-risk, liquid fund is probably imposed by this regulation alone.  For a Plan Participant nearing 
retirement – and even more so for a Plan Participant in retirement – an income-producing, low-risk, 
liquid investment alternative is normally appropriate. 
 44. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(b)(1)(i). 
 45. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(b)(2)(ii)(C). 
 46. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(b)(2)(ii)(C)(1). 
 47. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(b)(2)(ii)(C)(2)(i). 
 48. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(b)(2)(ii)(C)(2)(ii). 
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Sponsors have universally responded to these requirements by including 
a “principal-protection” alternative among their DC Plan investment 
alternatives.49  In order to meet this requirement, Plan Sponsors have 
invariably chosen to offer either a Stable Value Fund, or a Money 
Market Fund or both.50 
5. The Disclosure Requirement of Section 404(c) of ERISA. 
The regulations underlying Section 404(c) of ERISA require that “[t]he 
participant or beneficiary is provided or has the opportunity to obtain 
sufficient information to make informed decisions with regard to 
investment alternatives available under the plan.”51  More specifically, 
the regulations require: 
A description of the investment alternatives available under the plan 
and, with respect to each designated investment alternative, a general 
description of the investment objectives and risk and return 
characteristics of each such alternative, including information relating 
to the type and diversification of assets comprising the portfolio of the 
designated investment alternative.52 
 
B.  Part II 
 
1. Introduction to Stable Value Funds and Wrap Contracts. 
 
 
 49. Although the statute and regulations do not strictly mandate a principal-protection 
investment alternative, a Plan Sponsor would clearly have to include an option at least as 
conservative as a high-quality, short-duration bond fund in order to have its DC Plan design fall 
within the 404(c) Plan safe harbor.  In practice, however, all Plan Sponsors of 404(c) Plans offer a 
principal-protection investment alternative. 
 50. According to the 46th Annual Survey of Profit Sharing and 401(k) Plans (Profit Sharing 
and 401(k) Council of America), for the plan year 2002, 52.1% of plans had Stable Value options, 
54.6% had Money Market options, and 6.7% both.  Every single plan had one or the other.  In a 
telephone conversation on June 25, 2004, David Wrap, President of the Profit Sharing and 401(k) 
Plans Council, told the author that among larger plans, 70% had Stable Value; by overall assets, 
16.9% of Plan Participant assets were invested in Stable Value and 4.7% were invested in Money 
Market Funds.  Telephone Interview with David Wrap, President, Profit Sharing and 401(k) Plans 
Council, in New York City, NY (June 25, 2004). 
 51. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(b)(2)(i)(B). 
 52. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(b)(2)(i)(B)(1)(ii).  With respect to an investment in a Plan 
Sponsor’s stock, 29 C.F.R. §§ 2550.404c-1(b)(2)(i)(B)(1)(vii) and (viii): try to ensure that 
employers cannot monitor the choice employees make with respect to employer stock and thereby 
achieve a level of investment in employer stock by indirect pressures for which that they are 
unwilling to take fiduciary responsibility; and require that employees receive a copy of the Plan 
Sponsor’s most recent prospectus. 
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In order to judge whether the Sponsor of a 404(c) Plan has acted as a 
prudent expert in making the decision to offer (or not offer) Plan 
Participants the ability to invest in a Money Market Fund, a Stable Value 
Fund, or both, the reader must know something about the technical 
aspects of a Stable Value Fund.53 
Stable Value Funds are one of the more popular investment options 
among DC Plan Participants.54  The cornerstone of a Stable Value Fund 
is that it accounts for its investments at “contract value;” i.e., at cost, 
plus accrued interest.55  In order to be eligible to be reported at contract 
value, an investment must provide a guarantee that principal and 
accrued interest will be available to meet Plan Participants’ demands for 
benefits and transfers, each as permitted under their Plans.  This 
guarantee is provided by a “wrap contract” sold by large financial 
intermediaries, such as banks or insurance companies.56 
 
 53. This introduction is intended to be as general and brief as possible while still giving a 
reader who is new to Stable Value Funds all of the information that is necessary in order to make an 
informed decision about the fiduciary conduct of Plan Sponsors in choosing among low-risk 
investment options. For more information, see Paul J. Donahue, The Stable Value Wrap: Insurance 
Contract or Derivative? Experience Rated or Not?, 37 RISKS AND REWARDS (Investment Section of 
the Society of Actuaries, Shaumburg, IL), July 2001, at 18 [hereinafter Donahue, Stable Value 
Wrap]. 
 54. According to the Stable Value Investment Association, in 1998 Stable Value Funds held 
16% of DC Plan assets ($182 billion).  Donahue, Stable Value Wrap, supra note 54, at 25 n.2. 
 55. In other words, as with Money Market Funds, if a Plan Participant invests $1 in a Stable 
Value Fund he will, barring economic Armageddon, receive back $1 plus accrued interest.  (The 
“stable” in Stable Value Fund refers to this preservation of principal; account balances do not vary 
with changes in market interest rates, but only increase with credited interest.  The rate at which 
interest is credited will change frequently, perhaps as often as daily, but such changes will be very 
small in magnitude.).  See Paul J. Donahue, What AICPA SOP 94-4 Hath Wrought: The Demand 
Characteristics, Accounting Foundation and Management of Stable Value Funds, 16:1 BENEFITS 
QUARTERLY, First Quarter 2000, at 44, 46 [hereinafter Donahue, What AICPA SOP 94-4 Hath 
Wrought]. 
56.   AICPA Statement of Position 94-4, the Stable Value “constitution,” descriptively names 
this guarantee “a principal and accrued interest risk transfer.”  Industry practice describes this 
guarantee as “benefit responsiveness,” which is provided by the “benefit-responsive wrap contract,” 
or simply the “wrap.”  (In the discussion that follows, we shall refer to the principal and accrued 
interest risk transferred by these contracts as a “wrap”).  Statement of Position 94-4, Reporting of 
Investment Contracts Held by Health and Welfare Benefit Plans and Defined Contribution Pension 
Plans (American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, New York, NY, September 23, 1994) at 
15.  The staff of Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), arguably the most important non-
governmental financial regulator in the world, has finalized two Staff Positions, AAG Inv-1 and 
SOP 94-4-1.  See Reporting of Fully Benefit-Responsive Investment Contracts Held by Certain 
Investment Companies Subject to the AICPA Investment Company Guide, posted December 29, 
2005, http://www.fasb.org/fasb_staff_positions/fsp_aag_inv-1&sop_94-4-1.pdf (last visited Jan. 18, 
2006) [hereinafter AAG Inv-1].  This position, despite the limited scope of the title, amends SOP 
94-4, and thereby affects all Stable Value. The Financial Accounting Standards Board has modified 
SOP 94-4 in ways that are generally favorable for Stable Value plan participants. 
 It is effective December 15, 2006, for all plan years ending on or after that date. We will 
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In essence, a wrap assures that funds will always be available to pay 
Plan benefits and make transfers at contract value—regardless of the 
market value of the underlying assets in which Plan Participants’ 
accounts are invested.57  Sellers of wraps take the risk (for which they 
are compensated) that Plan Participants will withdraw large amounts 
from Stable Value Funds when the market value of the underlying assets 
in the Stable Value Fund is less than their book value.58  In extreme 
cases, such a withdrawal would force the wrap issuers to pay the Stable 
Value Fund money to make up the difference.59  This is most likely to 
happen when short-term interest rates, i.e., those offered on investments 
held in Money Market Funds, are higher than mid-term interest rates, 
i.e., those offered on investments held in Stable Value Funds.60  This risk 
is usually called “the risk of disintermediation.”61  Some inversion of the 
yield curve occurred at the end of 2005 for the first time in five years.62 
During a period of disintermediation, wrap sellers could face 
significant losses on wraps, if Plan Participants could readily transfer 
assets from a Stable Value Fund to a higher-yielding Money Market 
Fund.63  It is critical to recognize that modern Stable Value Fund 
investors almost never have available the option to transfer funds 
directly to a Money Market Fund. In order for a wrap to be a financially 
sound product, wrap sellers nearly universally insist that the 404(c) Plan 
not allow direct transfers from a Stable Value Fund into a Money Market 
Fund.64  In the typical 404(c) Plan that contains both a Stable Value Fund 
and a Money Market Fund, the Plan Participant must “wash” money 
 
discuss the effect of the amendment of SOP 94-4 below. See also Donahue, Stable Value Wrap, 
supra note 54; Donahue, What AICPA SOP 94-4 Hath Wrought, supra note 55, at 49. 
 57. Donahue, Stable Value Wrap, supra note 54, at 18. 
 58. Paul J. Donahue, Measuring Fair Value for Participation Units in Stable Value Pooled 
Funds, 41 RISKS AND REWARDS (Investment Section of the Society of Actuaries, Shaumburg, IL), 
Feb. 2003, at 29 [hereinafter Donahue, Stable Value Pooled Funds]. 
 59. Donahue, Stable Value Wrap, supra note 54, at 22. 
 60. Id. at 23. 
 61. Donahue, Stable Value Pooled Funds, supra note 58, at 29. 
 62. See CNNMoney.com, Markets and Stocks, http://money.cnn.com/2005/12/28/ 
markets/stockswatch/?cnn=yes (last visited Jan. 18, 2006). The last significant period of 
disintermediation occurred at the end of the 1970s and early 1980s, when the yield curve became 
severely inverted during a period of overall increases in interest rates.  Donahue, Stable Value 
Wrap, supra note 54, at 23.  The author is one of those who believes that globalization of finance 
has worked a shift in paradigm that makes extreme interest rate volatility of a major global markets 
participant, like the United States, much less probable, if not actually impossible. Minor inversions 
of the type that has just occurred do not pose that threat. 
 63. Donahue, Stable Value Wrap, supra note 54, at 23. 
 64. Id. 
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withdrawn from his Stable Value Fund account in an equity investment 
alternative for at least ninety days.65 
Naturally, an investment fund must actually qualify to use the wrap 
to value assets at contract value for the financial guarantee of the wrap 
contract to be of any benefit. For an employer separate account Stable 
Value Fund, compliance with the requirements of SOP 94-4 now 
provides that right.66 Pooled Stable Value Funds are generally organized 
as bank collective trusts.67 Bank collective investment trusts are 
governed by regulations issued by the Office of the Controller of the 
Currency  (OCC) found at 12 C.F.R. § 9.18.68 The basic requirement for 
valuation of collective investment funds is that they be valued at market 
value.69 However, in a letter dated December 21, 1995, the OCC 
permitted “CIFs consisting solely of defined contribution plan assets 
invested only in fully benefit-responsive GICs/SICs and liquid, short-
term securities and money instruments to [value] GICs/SICs at contract 
value.”70 
The last sentence of the letter reiterates that the exemption applies 
solely to funds consisting entirely of DC Plan assets: “The OCC will 
continue to require CIFs consisting of any defined benefit assets and all 
CIFS holding GICs/SICs that are not benefit-responsive to value those 
contracts at fair value.”71 
Since 1995, for a Stable Value pooled fund to accept defined benefit 
assets and to account for the fund at contract value, has been, at best, 
serious negligence. Recent discussions at the Securities Exchange 
Commission (SEC) and at the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
 
 65. Id.  This means that funds withdrawn from a Stable Value Fund have to remain in an 
equity fund, subjecting them to the risk of market loss, before those funds can be reinvested in a 
Money Market Fund. The atypical situation where direct transfers are permitted without an equity 
wash will be the focus of our discussion of a Plan Sponsor’s fiduciary duty relating to its decision 
whether to offer Plan Participants a Stable Value Fund, a Money Market Fund, or both. Id. 
 66. See supra note 56. In my view, the draft proposal would have raised questions about the 
continued availability of contract value accounting for individual Plan Sponsor Stable Value 
options, but the change of a single article, from “a relevant measurement attribute,” to “the relevant 
measurement attribute” addressed that concern. 
 67. LMStrategies.com, Stable Value Market Glossary, http://www.lmstrategies.com/ 
glossary.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2006) (stating the definition of GIC (stable value) pool). 
 68. 12 C.F.R. § 9.18 (2004). 
 69. 12 C.F.R. § 9.18 (b)(4)(ii). 
 70. Letter from Susan F. Krause, Senior Deputy Comptroller for Bank Supervision Policy, to 
Charles M. Horn (December 21, 1995) (on file with author).  GICs and SICs are types of investment 
contracts qualifying for Stable Value accounting under the rules of SOP 94-4.  
 71. Id. 
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(FASB) on wrap valuation72 makes the inappropriateness of accounting 
for a pooled fund with DB assets at contract value very clear. In the 
future, willful defiance of the OCC regulations will be the only plausible 
explanation for a pooled fund with defined benefit assets to account for 
the fund at contract value. 
One of the actions taken by FASB that will have the effect of 
increasing fees for Stable Value pooled funds, while quite possibly 
decreasing overall retirement security,73 is to allow pooled funds to 
contain Defined Benefit assets in contravention of OCC regulations and 
still to allow accounting at contract value. This is especially regrettable 
given that FASB must be aware of the OCC regulations.74 FASB’s 
action has the appearance of willingly condoning a violation of 
regulatory accounting requirements. 
The likelihood that FASB’s actions will induce many bank sponsors 
to value their Stable Value pooled funds in violation of requirements 
makes it vital that a Plan Sponsor obtain assurance from a Stable Value 
pooled fund bank sponsor that the pooled fund has no DB Plan investors. 
 
2. Stable Value Funds v. Money Market Funds as Low-Risk 
Investments. 
 
For investments with guaranteed protection of principal, an investor 
must normally sacrifice yield in order to gain liquidity, or sacrifice 
liquidity in order to increase yield.75  Obviously, an investor ought not 
give up more yield than the required liquidity demands—but that is 
precisely what Plan Sponsors who choose Money Market Funds instead  
 
 72. See infra Part II.B. 
 73. As we have discussed, a wrap provides a smoothing of transaction values in exchange 
for a wrap premium. Given their generally long-term investment horizon, DB plans should not agree 
to pay that premium, all other things equal. (Of course, in a particular circumstance, a lower 
management fee might entirely offset the cost of the wrap, and make the investment prudent.). 
Paying a premium for unneeded coverage reduces the funds available to pay the defined benefit. 
 74. The author personally raised this point in his comments on the FASB draft, available at 
http://www.fasb.org/ocl/FSPAAGINVA/34863.pdf, and in an e-mail dated 12/10/2005 to FASB 
staff and board members. 
 75. “Liquidity” is used in the sense intended in 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404(c)-1(b)(2)(ii)(C)(2)(ii): 
immediate access to funds.  For a principal-protected investment, this means the right to sell the 
Plan Participant’s units of participation to the fund at a price equal to the Plan Participant’s 
contributions, plus accumulated interest.  In the increasingly typical DC Plan that permits daily 
transactions, this means that the Plan Participant has the right to redeem his units on any day 
without prior notice.  In the language of financial options, the participant owns a “put,” a right to 
sell for a price equal to his contributions plus accumulated interest—regardless of the value of the 
assets owned by the fund. 
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of Stable Value Funds have done. 
All prudent financial enterprises must match their assets to their 
liabilities. A principal-protected option in a 404(c) Plan is no different.  
Money Market Funds can offer a stable net asset value because they 
invest in very short financial instruments governed by very strict SEC 
requirements.76  Stable Value Funds, on the other hand, can invest in 
longer-term financial instruments and still offer a stable net asset value 
because of their wraps.  Given the normal term structure of interest rates, 
longer-term financial instruments have a higher yield than shorter-term 
financial instruments.  As the following statistics make clear, Stable 














 76. SEC Investment Company Act of 1940, 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7 (2001). 
 77. The author knows of no quantitative analysis that attempts to show that Money Market 
Funds are superior to Stable Value Funds for risk/return preference.  I am grateful to Hueler 
Analytics, and particularly to Kathleen Schillo and Kelly Hueler, for giving me access and granting 
me permission to use Hueler Analytics’ copyrighted Stable Value Index data in the construction of 
these charts. The money market data is from the Donahue Money Market All Taxable Funds Index. 
I am grateful to my former INVESCO colleague Ruth Bottorff for her help in accessing the money 
market data, and to my former INVESCO colleague Andy Apostol for his help in turning the data 
into graphs that present so much valuable information. 
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a. How Stable Value Achieves So Favorable a Result 
 
In the retail, non-Pension Plan market, investors have no economic 
penalty for withdrawing their assets from a Money Market Fund on any 
day they choose.  However, investors who invest in Money Market 
Funds through their DC Plans are operating in a different environment.  
Federal income tax laws are designed to impose significant impediments 
to DC Plan Participants who, without these constraints, might apply 
savings intended for retirement to current consumption.  Thus, in order 
for DC Plans to qualify for the tax-deferral provided under the Internal 
Revenue Code, a DC Plan must impose significant restrictions on 
employee withdrawals.78  Accordingly, employed Plan Participants 
generally cannot withdraw money from the Plan, and terminated 
employees who are not retired pay a stiff penalty if they withdraw Plan 
assets before retirement age. 
By the very design of the laws under which it operates, i.e., the 
barriers to withdrawal imposed by the Plan and Federal income tax law, 
a DC Plan is ideally tailored to take advantage of the higher yields 
offered by a Stable Value Fund.  A Plan Sponsor who has only a Money 
Market Fund within its 404(c) Plan instead of a Stable Value Fund 
clearly has not taken these special legal circumstances into account.  
Stable Value Funds can prudently invest at much longer durations than 
Rule 2A7 permits for Money Market Funds, and thereby can make a 
much larger contribution to a Plan Participant’s retirement security than 
is possible with a Money Market Fund. 
 
3.  The Effect of AAG Inv-1. 
 
As noted above,79 FASB has amended SOP 94-4 and made 
additional requirements for pooled funds. However, in a statement that 
has the practical effect of leaving unchanged the foundational 
accounting reality that contract valuation is available for Stable Value 
investment contracts the amendment notes that “contract value is the 
relevant measurement attribute for that portion of the net assets available 
 
 78. A DC Plan will not be a tax-favored “qualified plan” unless, among many other 
requirements, benefits begin no earlier than the latest of: (1) normal retirement age under the plan or 
age 65, whichever is earlier (26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(14)(A)) (2005); (2) a participant’s tenth 
anniversary of participation (26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(14)(B)); or (3) termination of employment (26 
U.S.C. § 401(a)(14)(C)).  Employees who access plan assets after termination but before reaching 
age 59 1/2 must, in most circumstances, pay a 10% excise tax in addition to their regular rate of 
income tax.  26 U.S.C. § 72(t)(1) (2005). 
 79. See supra note 56. 
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for benefits of a defined-contribution plan attributable to fully benefit-
responsive contracts.”80 
With the exception of the required disclosures, the proposed changes 
are extremely favorable to Stable Value investors. Of paramount 
importance, the requirement that pooled funds disclose the termination 
provisions of their wraps will make the extent of true protection much 
more evident.81 
The required disclosures about benefit-responsive contracts 
proposed by the draft will make selection against the Stable Value 
option easier.82 We discuss the peril of this situation in a particular 
context below.83 
 
4. Offering Both a Stable Value and Money Market Fund. 
 
When a Plan Sponsor offers both a Stable Value Fund and a Money 
Market Fund, any loss a Plan Participant suffers as a result of choosing 
the Money Market Fund over the Stable Value Fund seems at first 
glance to be clearly the direct result of Participant direction.  Even 
though offering the Money Market Fund at all is likely a breach of Plan 
Sponsor fiduciary duty, because the participant can choose Stable Value, 
the Plan Sponsor is unlikely to be liable for losses the Participants incur.  
This is different from the situation where a Stable Value Fund is not 
offered at all. 
However, while the Plan Sponsor may not be liable for losses 
suffered by those investing in the Money Market Fund, there may now 
be some Sponsor liability to participants in the Stable Value Fund!84  It 
is the foundation of this article that option selection is a Plan Sponsor 






 80. Id. 
 81. See AAG Inv-1, supra note 56. 
 82. The plan’s statement of net assets available for benefits must list total assets, net assets at 
fair value, and net assets available for benefits.  AAG Inv-1, supra note 56, at 14. If the net assets 
available for benefits are less than the fair value, an informed participant knows that, pari passu, 
there is an immediate gain on withdrawal or transfer. This raises the risk of disintermediation 
overall, and makes practically certain that some informed participants will benefit at the expense of 
less-informed participants. 
 83. See infra notes 86-95 and accompanying text. 
 84. See infra note 106 and accompanying text. 
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5. Poor Plan Design Can Limit Return in a Stable Value Fund. 
 
We noted above that disintermediation is the principal risk faced by 
wrap sellers.85  DC Plan design is the first line of defense against 
disintermediation,86 and responsible DC Plan design is part of a Plan 
Sponsor’s fiduciary duty.87  The most obvious DC Plan design that 
avoids this risk is one that offers only a Stable Value Fund and no other 
low-risk option.88 
If a Plan Sponsor chooses to offer a second low-risk option, the 
responsible Plan Sponsor must prohibit direct transfers from one low-
risk option to another, to protect unsophisticated investors in each option 
against the risk of disintermediation.89  In the language of the Stable 
Value Fund industry, low-risk options other than Stable Value are called 
“competing funds.”90 Sound Plan design requires that if a Participant 
transfers money from a low-risk option, the money must go to an equity 
fund or a long-duration bond fund (the “equity wash”).91  This 
requirement forces Participants to expose withdrawals from a low-risk 
option fund to market risk and serves as a disincentive to such 
withdrawals that are based purely on disintermediation.92 
Where both a Money Market Fund and a Stable Value Fund are 
available within a given 404(c) Plan, the equity wash protects against 
disintermediation and allows the Stable Value Fund to achieve its full 
return potential.93  Since wrap issuers will insist on some form of risk 
protection, the absence of an equity wash translates into a lower return 
for Stable Value Fund Participants.94 
 
 85. See Paul J. Donahue & Stephen F. LeLaurin, Stable Value, Money Market or Both?  
Implications for Plan Sponsors and for the Stable Value Industry, with, 6:4 STABLE TIMES (Stable Value 
Investment Association, Washington, D.C.), Fourth Quarter 2002, at 15 [hereinafter Donahue, Stable 
Value or Money Market]. 
 86. Id. at 10. 
 87. Id. at 11. 
 88. Id. at 10.  In such case, Plan Participants would not be able to move their assets from the 
Stable Value Fund to the higher-yielding Money Market Fund. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Mark Foley, Competing Funds: “Barbarians at the Gate” or “The Phantom Menace,” 
8:1 STABLE TIMES (Stable Value Investment Association, Washington, D.C.), First Quarter 2004. 
Stable Value Fund wrap contracts negotiated by the author typically defined fixed income funds 
with a duration of less than three years as “competing funds.” 
 91. Donahue, Stable Value or Money Market, supra note 86, at 10. 
 92. Id.  Principal protection is a key value to any investor who chooses Stable Value or 
Money Market.  The requirement that a participant put principal at risk to shift from a Stable Value 
Fund to a Money Market Fund to capture a short-term gain is therefore a significant disincentive. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
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6. Eliminating an Equity Wash: A Violation of Fiduciary Duty. 
 
Where a 404(c) Plan has both a Stable Value Fund and a Money 
Market Fund and the requirement of an equity wash, there is no doubt 
that some Plan Participants regard the equity wash as an irritant.95  Those 
Plan Participants are more likely to be financially sophisticated and able 
to exert more pressure on Plan design.96  In effect, they are seeking the 
right to disadvantage the less financially sophisticated Plan Participants, 
as we shall illustrate below.97  Nothing could be a clearer violation of 
Plan Sponsor fiduciary duty than for the Sponsor to give in to this 
pressure. 
Plan Sponsors who insist on a Plan design that has both a Stable 
Value and a Money Market Fund—and that permits direct transfers 
without an equity wash—have abandoned the best defense against the 
disintermediation risk absorbed by wrap issuers.98  This abandonment 
has significant consequences.  Wrap issuers are not in the business of 
transferring wealth from themselves to well-advised Plan Participants in 
adverse investment environments.  When Plan design does not provide 
the protection that wrap issuers need, the investment strategy of the 
underlying Stable Value Fund portfolio or the terms of the wrap contract 
(or both) must provide the protection that the wrap issuers have lost.99 
All wrap contracts have requirements for how the Stable Value Fund 
is to be invested.100  This requirement is rational because what wrap 
sellers are insuring is the difference between book and market values 
within the Stable Value Fund, which the Fund’s investment strategies 
can sharply influence.  “Risky” plans might necessitate a shorter 
duration fund (to minimize book to market differences).  In the extreme, 
the Plan that allows direct transfers to a Money Market Fund might need 
to require that the Stable Value Fund have a duration close to that of the 
Money Market Fund.101  This would minimize the issuer’s risk, but it 
would also erode any return advantage to participants.  Forcing shorter 
 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. The author personally negotiated hundreds of wrap contracts for the nation’s leading 
Stable Value manager, and read hundreds of others negotiated by other managers. 
 101. Donahue, Stable Value or Money Market, supra note 85, at 10. 
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durations could easily reduce the Stable Value Fund’s yield advantage 
by 50%.102 
Wrap issuers insist on more flexible termination provisions in their 
wrap contracts where direct transfers are permitted.  Understandably, 
they want to be able to get out of the contract on reasonably short notice 
when the potential for losses becomes high.  The author has argued 
elsewhere that the termination provision of a wrap contract is its most 
important feature: “A contract the issuer can terminate at will after only 
a short time is practically worthless to the plan that owns it.”103  A wrap 
contract that can terminate just when Money Market Fund yields exceed 
Stable Value Fund yields will lead to the total disappearance of principal 
protection in the Stable Value Fund, turning the option into a short-term 
bond fund with market losses.104  This would come as a rude surprise to 
Plan Participants and could subject Plan Sponsors to an unforeseen 
liability to make Plan Participants whole.105 
Finally, in the presence of direct transfers to Money Market Funds, 
even though wrap sellers might have significant investment restrictions 
and the right to walk away, they also charge more for this abbreviated 
coverage.106  Even after the increased protection of more restrictive 
investment guidelines and more expansive exit provisions, the residual 
risk is still greater and requires an increased risk charge.  This further 
reduces the yield advantage of the Stable Value Fund option by another 
10%.107 
In total, Plan Sponsors may sacrifice half or more of the total yield 
advantage of Stable Value Funds over Money Market Funds when they 
choose to permit direct transfers between such funds.108  The only 
potential beneficiaries of this loss of yield are financially sophisticated, 
market-timing Plan Participants who seek to benefit at the expense of 
their less sophisticated co-Participants.109  In normal yield environments, 
all Participants will suffer.  Over the periods of time appropriate to 
consider for a program of retirement savings, the differences in wealth 
accumulation are meaningful, 36% or more over 15 years, based on the 
results set out in the Accumulation graph in Section B(2) supra. 
 
 102. Id. 
 103. Donahue, What AICPA SOP 94-4 Hath Wrought, supra note 55, at 50. 
 104. Id. 
 105. The author bases this assertion on his judgment that sponsor disclosure about the Stable 
Value option is not adequate to alert participants to this possibility. 
 106. The author was involved personally in price negotiations on such contracts. 
 107. Donahue, Stable Value or Money Market, supra note 86, at 10. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
23
Donahue: Plan Sponsor Fiduciary Duty
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2006
DONAHUE1.DOC 3/20/2006  9:15:18 AM 
32 AKRON LAW REVIEW [39:9 
In fact, a Plan Sponsor’s fiduciary problem is most severe precisely 
when the right to transfer is advantageous.  A Plan design option that 
victimizes all Participants when it is not advantageous to transfer assets 
benefits only those who move quickly when it is advantageous.110  And it 
benefits those who move only at the expense of those who remain 
behind.111  In essence, the Plan Sponsor has purchased—for a premium 
assessed against all Participants—the right for a few to benefit at the 
expense of the many.112  Though no doubt made unknowingly, this Plan 
Sponsor decision is clearly not in the best interests of Plan Participants.  
Courts should hold Plan Sponsors liable for losses suffered by 
unsophisticated Plan Participants both as a result of the defective design 
of the Plan and of “anti-selection” by the financially sophisticated few, 
who are far more likely to be highly-compensated employees.  Based on 
the results set out in the graphs above, Plan Sponsor liability for a design 
that sacrificed 25% of the yield advantage of the Stable Value Fund in 
order to include a Money Market Fund, which would only be a snare for 
the unwary and an opportunity for those trying to take advantage of 
them, is likely to range from 5% to 10% of the value of the Stable Value 
Fund. 
 
7. Disclosure Required for Stable Value Funds Where Direct 
Transfers to Money Market Funds are Allowed. 
 
It is the author’s view that adequate disclosure to Plan Participants in 
404(c) Plans that allow direct transfers between both Money Market and 
Stable Value Funds must alert the Participants to the possibility of 
profiting by moving from one fund to the other.  This disclosure should 
describe in general terms when it is likely to be in a Participant’s interest 
to move from one fund to the other. 
The basic untenability of offering both a Stable Value and Money 
Market Fund without an equity wash emerges at this point.  No wrap 
issuer would sell a wrap to a Plan which provided the foregoing 
disclosure—which we have just argued is necessary—because this 
disclosure would intensify the risk of loss to the wrap issuer in an 
adverse interest rate environment. 
 
 
 110. Id. 
 111. Donahue, Stable Value Wrap, supra note 54, at 21-22. 
 112. See supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.  The amount by which the Stable Value 
return is lower, which we discussed above, see supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text, is the 
“premium” the plan is paying for the right of financially well-informed participants to be able to 
“put” their Stable Value investment to the fund in order to buy Money Market. 
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8. Disclosure Implications of AAG Inv-1. 
 
The disclosures required by AAG Inv-1 will make selection against 
other participants easier.113 This raises the concern that Plan Sponsors 
will have to attempt to educate all participants about this possibility, 
potentially reducing the effectiveness of the option as a tool for long-
term financial accumulation. However, the prudent response by a Plan 
Sponsor will be to take no action to make additional information 
available to participants where, in the exercise of prudence, it is not 
generally in the interests of participants to do so. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
Plan Sponsor choice of Plan options in Section 404(c) participant-
directed plans is a fiduciary responsibility of the Plan Sponsor. Section 
404(c) does not relieve Plan Sponsors of liability for failing to uphold 
ERISA’s “prudent expert” fiduciary duty standard in choosing plan 
options. Further, a Plan Sponsor must provide adequate disclosure of the 
risks and returns of each option offered, as well as having selected the 
option prudently, in order to shift the liability for their option selections 
to Plan Participants. 
Stable Value Fund or Money Market Fund is a universal example of 
Plan Sponsor exercise of option selection, because of the requirement of 
a liquid, low volatility fund. In the context of a DC Plan, Stable Value 
has an absolute superiority to Money Market, as any reasonable due 
diligence investigation would make clear. The choice of a Money 
Market Fund instead of a Stable Value Fund meaningfully decreases 
Participant wealth and is a clear violation of a Plan Sponsor’s duty to 
select options as a prudent expert. Participants who were offered only 
Money Market Funds have a right to recover the difference in lost 
income from Plan Sponsors as damages due to a breach of fiduciary 
duty. 
Employer disclosure that does not identify the opportunity to profit 
from direct transfers between Stable Value and Money Market Funds is 
similarly inadequate. Participants who lost out because of the transfers 
of others are in the absence of adequate disclosure entitled to recover 
from the Plan Sponsor. 
 
 113. See supra note 61. 
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